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When unemployment insurance is publicly provided, ﬁrms’ layoﬀ decisions can be distorted.
Unemployment insurance reduces the cost of laying oﬀ workers, thereby encouraging layoﬀs
and leading to more unemployment. To dampen this increase in unemployment, it has been
suggested that unemployment insurance should be ﬁnanced with an experience rated tax.
This paper examines the possibility that, despite that increasing the level of experience
rating can reduce the level of unemployment, it can also reduce the wealth of unemployed
workers. The reason is that, under high level of experience rating, ﬁrms may reduce their
severance payments by more than the publicly provided unemployment insurance beneﬁt.
We build a model where competitive ﬁrms oﬀer long-term contracts to risk-averse workers.
Asymmetric information about worker’s productivity leads to over unemployment and
incomplete private insurance against unemployment. This paper shows that an experience
rated unemployment insurance program cannot increase the wealth of unemployed workers
without increasing unemployment.
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The primary objective of unemployment insurance is to provide coverage to workers in
the presence of risky future employment opportunities. However, implementing unem-
ployment insurance introduces adverse distortions in the economy. One distortion is that
unemployment insurance reduces the cost of laying oﬀ workers, and consequently ﬁrms
increase the number of layoﬀs leading to more unemployment. One instrument to dampen
or eliminate this perverse eﬀect is experience rating in the way unemployment insurance
is ﬁnanced. In the presence of experience rating, ﬁrms have to pay a tax proportional to
the total cost they are imposing on the unemployment insurance program from their layoﬀ
decisions. Without experience rating, unemployment insurance acts like a subsidy to ﬁrms
for laying oﬀ workers. However, experience rating increases the cost of laying oﬀ workers
and can counterbalance the negative distortion introduced by unemployment insurance.
With perfect experience rating, Topel and Welch (1980) have demonstrated that ﬁrms have
to pay the full cost of unemployment insurance, and subsequently, there is no increase in
unemployment when the government introduces such a program. One important question
that has been overlooked in the literature is howexperience rating aﬀect the government’s
ability to better insure workers against unemployment. This paper shows that to better
insure workers, a government will consequently increase the level of unemployment. Fur-
ther, full experience rating is non-distortionary and yet does not increase the welfare of
unemployed workers.
In practice, experience rating is not prevalent. The majority of countries only use payroll
taxes to ﬁnance their unemployment insurance programs. Even countries like the United
States which use experience rating, only use it partially. An important question is: if
experience rating is eﬃcient, why is it not a more prominent feature in unemployment
insurance programs? Marceau (1993) and Burdett and Wright (1989) showthat increasing
the level of experience rating can lead to more unemployment. Under Cournot competition
and free entry, or variable ﬁrm size, increasing the level of experience rating can increase
unemployment by reducing the number of ﬁrms (or ﬁrm size).
This paper highlights another un-desirable eﬀect of experience rating. When experience
1rating increases, the unemployment insurance program loses the ability to increase the
welfare of unemployed workers. Public insurance crowds out private insurance. With high
levels of experience rating, some workers can be hurt ex post by an increase in unemploy-
ment insurance because private insurance diminishes by more than public beneﬁt.
In this model ﬁrms oﬀer long-term contracts to risk averse workers. Firms have no prior
information about the ability of workers hired. However, once working, ﬁrms learn their
workers’ abilities. At some point, ﬁrms must decide whether to retain or layoﬀ each
worker on the basis of their observed quality. In this environment, all layoﬀs will be
permanent. Oswald (1986) notes that from 1973-1976 in the United States, 40% of layoﬀs
in the manufacturing sector were permanent. More recently this proportion has fallen,
but permanent layoﬀs are still an important source of unemployment in the manufacturing
sector. The proportion of permanent layoﬀs is much larger in a sector less aﬀected by
seasonal or demand ﬂuctuations. Because workers are risk-averse, ﬁrms provide long-term
insurance contracts to workers by using severance payments. In reality, severance payments
are only paid for permanent layoﬀs. Half of the workers in manufacturing (one quarter
in non-manufacturing) receive severance payments. The introduction of unemployment
insurance will allow ﬁrms to reduce their severance payments and consequently reduce the
private cost of laying oﬀ a worker.
When a ﬁrm lays oﬀ workers, other ﬁrms infer the average ability of both the ﬁred workers
and the retained workers. Laid-oﬀ workers are tagged as low-ability and receive lower
wage oﬀers. If this wage oﬀer is too low, these workers prefer to remain unemployed.
This happens to unemployed workers with abilities above the average. Since they would
be willing to accept a job paying their marginal productivity, a portion of unemployment
can be somehowconsidered as involuntary. Gibbons and Katz (1991) showthat post-
displacement wage oﬀers are lower for workers displaced by layoﬀs than for those displaced
by plant closings. This suggests that there is important information contained in the layoﬀ
decisions of ﬁrms. As noted above, ﬁrms also infer the average ability of retained workers
and subsequently make wage oﬀers to attract them from their current employer. This
implies that ﬁrms will have to make an initial wage oﬀer to the workers they want to keep
which is large enough to ensure loyalty. This constraint on wages prevent ﬁrms from being
2able to perfectly insure workers.
In a similar framework Waldman (1984) shows that when a worker’s ability is the private
information of the present employer, but other ﬁrms are able to observe promotions, ﬁrms
will tend to promote too few workers. The reason is that a promoted worker has to be paid
according to her inferred average ability, while ﬁrms make their promotions according to
the marginal ability of the worker. Similarly we ﬁnd that ﬁrms will lay oﬀ too many workers
as compared to the eﬃcient allocation. Workers with reservation wages which are less than
their productivities will end up being unemployed. Laing (1994) has also examined the
impact of asymmetric information on ﬁrms’ layoﬀ decisions. He has shown that there are
too many layoﬀs and that seniority rules could eliminate this distortion. Seniority rules
eliminate some ﬁrm discretion in making layoﬀs, and make it harder for ﬁrms to infer the
ability of workers after a layoﬀ decision has been made. The American Bureau of Labor
Statistic stated that in 1997 only 14% of American workers were unionized, suggesting
that there is still a large amount of discretion in layoﬀ decisions.
This paper focuses on the impact of introducing an unemployment insurance program in a
similar environment that the one describe in Gibbons and Katz (1991). Since ﬁrms do not
oﬀer full insurance, government may want to introduce public unemployment insurance.
On the other hand, a “laissez-faire” economy results in too many layoﬀs as compared to
the eﬃcient allocation so that the government has an incentive to reduce unemployment.
We will show that an experience rated unemployment insurance system cannot achieve
both objectives at the same time.
In the next section, we present the basic model. Then, we depict the sequences of events
governing ﬁrms’ decisions. The characterization of the equilibrium is done in section 4.
In section 5, we look at the impact of government intervention. Finally we provide some
concluding remarks. All proofs are included in the appendix.
2.The Model
The economy is composed of a measure of N workers, indexed by ability, born in each
3period. Workers live for two periods. We call the workers young in the ﬁrst period of life,
and old in the second period. The ability of a worker is given by θ,wh e r e θ is distributed
uniformly on [θ ,θ h].1 Workers are risk averse and do not discount the future. The per
period, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, utility function is given by U = U(W +R)wh e r e
W is the outside income and R is home production. This home production takes a value
of zero if the worker is working, and a positive value of r if the worker is unemployed.
It is also assumed that U (W + R) ≥ 0, U  (W + R) ≤ 0a n dU   (W + R) ≥ 0.2 Each
worker supplies one unit of work inelastically to the ﬁrm that oﬀers the highest wage. It
is assumed that if wage oﬀers are the same, workers prefer to stay with their current ﬁrm.
This economy is also composed of N identical ﬁrms that live forever.3 Firms do not dis-
count the future, take prices as given and are risk neutral. The output price is normalized
to one. It is assumed that ﬁrms have full discretion over the layoﬀ decisions. If in any
period, a ﬁrm is not able to attract neww orkers, the ﬁrm goes bankrupt and has to suﬀer
a bankruptcy cost of C.4 The productivity of a worker depends on that worker’s ability
level, and is simply equal to θ. All ﬁrms knowthe distribution of θ. We assume that
θ  <r<θ h,a n dt h a tθ
 +θ
h
2 >r . That is, some workers are more productive at home
than at work but, on average, a worker is more productive at work.
The ability level of a young worker is not observable by ﬁrms or the worker himself.5
After the ﬁrst period, both the ﬁrm and the worker learn the value of θ.N o o t h e r ﬁ r m
learns about the ability level of the worker. This reﬂects the fact that ﬁrms have better
1 For simplicity we assume that θh − θ  = 1. However, this assumption does not change the
nature of the results.
2 Assumptions about the third derivative of utility function are uncommon. Later on, this
assumption will be use to derive particular suﬃcient condition for some results to hold. It
will be mentioned later that even if U   () < 0 (but small) the results will still hold. Moreover,
most common utility functions have this feature.
3 The fact that the number of ﬁrms is equal to the measure of workers ensures that in equilib-
rium, there is a measure of one worker per ﬁrm.
4 This cost can be interpreted in various ways. It could be legal costs. It can also be interpreted
as costs related to bad credit records. Finally, it can be manager’s disutility from having to
ﬁnd a new job. Boadway and Marceau (1995) use the same kind of assumption
5 This implies that separating contracts where ﬁrms oﬀer a menu of contracts will not be
possible.
4information about their own workers than do other ﬁrms. The ability level of a worker
is always unveriﬁable to a third party, so contracts with wages contingent on θ are not
enforceable. Which party initiates separation is also not observable outside the ﬁrm. This
is assumed since either party can take actions which induce the other party to initiate
separation. This implies that contracts involving separation payments are not enforceable.6
However, workers in a ﬁrm are able to observe the reason for separation.7 By reputation,
young workers know if, in the past, a ﬁrm agreed to pay a severance payment, and did not
fulﬁll its obligation. Since ﬁrms need to hire neww orkers so they do not have to shutdow n,
reputation will ensure that in equilibrium, ﬁrms pay severance payments. On the other
hand, workers who live for only two periods, are not able to commit themselves to staying
with their present ﬁrm if they receive a better wage somewhere else.
3.Sequence of Events
The OLG framework implies that the sequence of events diﬀers from the viewpoint of
ﬁrms and workers. Workers are young in the ﬁrst period and old in the second period. On
the other hand, ﬁrms live forever. At time zero, ﬁrms have to choose between making an
investment in capital or not. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms oﬀer a long-term
contract to young workers. Let wy be the wage oﬀer to a young worker, wo be the wage
oﬀer to an old worker, and s the severance payment oﬀered to workers in the event they are
ﬁred. Workers then choose to work for the ﬁrm that oﬀers the best contract.8 Production
then takes place and wages are paid. Once the production phase has ended, the worker
and the ﬁrm learn the ability level θ. Finally, ﬁrms that cannot hire neww orkers shutdow n
and incur a bankruptcy cost C.
Now, consider the sequence of event for the second period. In the second period, ﬁrms
know the ability level of all their old workers. The wagewo and the severance payment are
already determined from the contract signed in the previous period. Although ﬁrms are
6 Macleod and Malcomson (1989) and Carmichael (1983) used the same type of argument.
7 Workers in a ﬁrm are able to see the diﬀerence between a worker who quits voluntary and
another one who quits because the ﬁrm pressured the worker to leave.
8 If all ﬁrms oﬀer the same contract, workers will distribute themselves evenly among all ﬁrms.
5not legally constrained to make severance payments, reputations will ensure they are paid.
First, ﬁrms choose which workers to ﬁre and choose to pay severance payments or not. If a
ﬁrm chooses not to pay severance payments to their workers, no more young workers will
want to work for that ﬁrm.9 Workers that are ﬁred join the pool of unemployed, and can
try to ﬁnd a newjob. Next, ﬁrms oﬀer long-term contracts to the newgeneration of young
workers. Firms also make a wage oﬀer to unemployed workers. Firms are able to infer
the average ability of a ﬁred worker using the information contained in the layoﬀ decisions
and consequently make a wage oﬀer w 
o. Then unemployed workers choose between taking
a new job or staying unemployed. Firms also try to attract workers that were not ﬁred
from other ﬁrms. Since workers die at the end of this period, there are no concerns about
reputation that prevent workers from changing ﬁrms. Consequently, the wagewo oﬀered in
the contract has to be generous enough to keep workers from leaving in the second period
spot market. Finally, production take place, wages and cost of capital are paid, and the
second period ends with bankruptcy of ﬁrms that do not pay their user cost of capital.
The sequence is then respected for all generations.
In this paper, we concentrate on the steady state equilibrium. The fact that contracts
oﬀered to one generation of workers are not aﬀected by the interaction with any other
generation of workers makes this steady state equilibrium easy to compute.
4.Equilibrium Without Unemployment Insurance
4.1. Case Where Severance Payments Are Enforceable
First, we consider an equilibrium without public intervention. To begin, we analyze an
equilibrium when workers can commit themselves to stay at the same ﬁrm despite the fact
that they may receive a better oﬀer from other ﬁrms. If severance payments are enforceable
by a court, contracts can involve large ﬁnes when a worker leaves a ﬁrm without being
ﬁred. Firms compete with one another to attract young workers by oﬀering long-term
contracts {wy,w o,s} that maximize the lifetime expected utility of a young worker subject
9 Young worker are able to identify instantaneously ﬁrms who do not pay severance payments.
Allowing for a delay will not change the nature of the results.
6to their constraints.
Firms will make a better oﬀer to workers as long as they receive positive proﬁts. Com-
petition drives proﬁt to zero, so the zero proﬁt constraint will always be strictly satisﬁed.
Let ¯ θ denote the worker’s ability level for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between keeping or
ﬁring her. To ﬁnd the ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts, we ﬁrst solve for ¯ θ. The beneﬁt of keeping
a worker with ability θ is θ − wo. On the other hand, the cost of ﬁring the worker is s.
Firms will keep all old workers for which θ ≥ wo − s so ¯ θ = wo − s. The ﬁrm’s expected
operating proﬁts from a young worker are:10
E[Π]=
θ  + θh
2
− wy +[¯ θ − θ
 ](−s)+[ θ
h − ¯ θ]





However, the ﬁrms need to make operating proﬁts large enough to cover the user cost of
capital. It implies that the zero proﬁt condition is given by E[π] ≥ 0.
As mentioned earlier, ﬁrms oﬀer contracts that maximize the expected utility of young
workers. Let E[U] be the expected utility of a young worker, which is a function of the
contract {wy,w o,s}. Speciﬁcally:
E[U]=U(wy)+[¯ θ − θ ]U(r + s)+[ θh − ¯ θ]U(wo). (2)




U(wy)+[ wo − s − θ
 ]U(r + s)+[ θ




θ  + θh
2
− wy +[ wo − s − θ ](−s)+[ θh − wo + s]






10 Since there is no population growth and no discounting, the per period proﬁts and the proﬁts
from one generation of workers are the same.
7and s ≥ 0
In other words, ﬁrms maximize the expected utility function of a young worker subject to
the zero-proﬁt condition, and a non-negativity constraint on severance payments.
Proposition 1: When severance payments are enforceable, ﬁrms are fully smoothing
workers’ utility across periods and are fully insuring workers again unemployment.
Since workers can commit to stay at the same ﬁrm, ﬁrms only face the zero-proﬁts con-
straint when they determine the wage of those old worker. Because workers are risk averse,
ﬁrms equalize utility of workers across periods and across employment status. This implies
that wy = wo = s + r.
Corollary 1: Since ﬁrms are fully insuring workers, layoﬀs decisions are eﬃcient in the
sense that ¯ θ = r.
Under perfect insurance, the layoﬀs decisions are eﬃcient for the following reason. The
last old worker to be kept is the one for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between ﬁring or
keeping her. The cost of ﬁring her is the foregone production θ, while the beneﬁt is the
diﬀerence between the wage wo and the severance payment s. Because workers are fully
insured, the diﬀerence is simply r, so it implies that ¯ θ = r.
When severance payments are enforceable, workers can commit to stay at the same ﬁrm.
Firms oﬀer a full insurance contract to young risk averse workers. Under this full insurance
contract, workers who are more productive at home are laid oﬀ and workers that are
more productive at work are retained. Consequently, there is no reason for government
intervention.
84.2. Case Where Severance Payments Are Not Enforceable
Nowconsider an equilibrium w hen severance payments are not enforceable in court. Again,
ﬁrms compete with one another to attract young workers by oﬀering long-term contracts.
Firms oﬀer a contract {wy,w o,s} that maximizes the lifetime expected utility of a young
worker subject to their constraints. Since severance payments are not enforceable in court,
and workers live for only two periods, the ﬁrst constraint is s ≥ 0.
A second constraint requires that the wage oﬀer to old workers be large enough to ensure
second period loyalty. Once a ﬁrm has ﬁred some old workers, other ﬁrms acquire some
information about the quality of the workers that the ﬁrm keeps. Firms can now make an
oﬀer to workers that were not ﬁred. With competition among ﬁrms, we know that other
ﬁrms will oﬀer a wage equal to the average productivity of a retained worker. Let ¯ θ denote
the worker’s ability level for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between keeping or ﬁring her.
Since all workers with a ability level greater than or equal to ¯ θ are kept, the average ability
of these workers is given by
¯ θ+θ
h
2 . If ﬁrms wish to retain workers with ability greater than
or equal to ¯ θ they must set wo ≥
¯ θ+θ
h
2 , the average ability of remaining workers.
Finally, ﬁrms will make a better oﬀer to workers as long as the ﬁrm receives positive proﬁts.
Here again, the zero-proﬁt constraint will always be strictly satisﬁed. As in the previous
section, ﬁrms ﬁre all workers for which θ<¯ θ where ¯ θ = wo−s. The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts
from a young worker are given in (1).
Before looking at the contract oﬀered to young workers, we ﬁrst consider the problem of
old workers who are ﬁred. Workers who are ﬁred receive an oﬀer w 
o from other ﬁrms. From
competition, we know that the oﬀer made corresponds to the worker’s average ability con-
ditional on being ﬁred. This implies that w 
o = θ
 +¯ θ
2 .I fw 
o >r , there is no unemployment
because all ﬁred workers accept an oﬀer from another ﬁrm. Since the objective of this
paper is to look at the impact of unemployment insurance in this type of environment, we
focus on an equilibrium in which w 
o ≤ r.








θ  + θh
2
− wy +[ wo − s − θ ](−s)+[ θh − wo + s]






wo ≥ θh − s and s ≥ 0.
In other words, ﬁrms maximize the expected utility function of a young worker subject
to the zero-proﬁt condition, the second period wage restriction, and a non-negativity con-
straint on severance payments.
Proposition 2: There exists a long-term contract {w 
y,w  
o,s  } which is a function of
{r, θh,θ  } that solves the ﬁrm’s problem.
Looking at the ﬁrst order condition of this problem, one observation is that the constraint
on the wage of a old worker is binding. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to wo is
strictly negative, so that wo = θh − s. Using this result, we ﬁnd the cut-oﬀ level of ¯ θ,b y
solving for the ability level of a worker that makes a ﬁrm indiﬀerent between ﬁring her or
not. If ¯ θ is smaller than θ , the ﬁrm simply keeps all workers. Since the objective of this
paper is to analyze UI system in this particular environment, we will restrict ourself to
cases where some workers are laid-oﬀ, which corresponds to ¯ θ>θ  . Firms ﬁre all workers
with θ ≤ ¯ θ,wh e r e ¯ θ = θh − 2s .
Now that we have solved for the contract oﬀered to young workers, we will verify that
ﬁrms have an incentive to pay the severance payments to the laid-oﬀ workers. If a ﬁrm
does not pay the severance payment to all workers, the ﬁrm gains [¯ θ − θ ]s . However,
when a ﬁrm does not pay the severance payment to ﬁred workers, no more young workers
choose to work for that ﬁrm. Consequently, the ﬁrm will go bankrupt after the end of the
period. The cost of not paying severance payments is the bankruptcy cost C.A sl o n ga s
C ≥ [¯ θ − θ ]s , ﬁrms will prefer paying severance payments to workers they ﬁre. For the
10rest of the paper, it is assumed that the bankruptcy cost is large enough to ensure that
ﬁrms have an incentive to pay severance payments in equilibrium. We will now study the
properties of the contract {w 
y,w  
o,s  }.
Lemma 1: Firms are not able to fully smooth workers’ utility across periods and fully
insure workers as long there exists some workers who are more productive at home.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is the following. The only way that the ﬁrms are able to
satisfy the zero-proﬁt condition and simultaneously alloww orkers to receive the same level
of utility in both periods, is if they do not ﬁre any old workers, ¯ θ = θ . When ﬁrms do
not ﬁre any workers, the wage oﬀered to old workers is θ
 +θ
h
2 . Firms can smooth workers’








2 − r and make zero proﬁts
since they never have to pay severance payments. However, the problem with this contract
is that if r>θ  , ﬁrms prefer to ﬁre all workers with ability level θ<r . The reason is
that if they keep one of these low-ability workers, they have to pay wo and the worker
only produces θ<r . However, if the ﬁrm ﬁres these workers, it only has to pay wo − r.
Firms will prefer to ﬁre workers with θ<rand not have to pay the value of the home
production, required for keeping these workers. Since we already made the assumption
that some workers are more productive at home, we know that perfect smoothing of utility
across periods is not possible.
An implication which we state in Proposition 3 is that w 
o >w  
y. This implies that the
model predicts an increasing wage proﬁle for retained workers as usually observed in the
data.
Proposition 3: The equilibrium long-term contract schedule does not fully insure old
workers, and the wage of a young workers is less than the total compensation of workers
who are laid oﬀ, w 
y <r+ s  <w  
o.
We already knowthat perfect smoothing is not possible. Proposition 3 show s that al-
though perfect insurance for old workers is not an outcome in equilibrium, they are still
guaranteed to be better oﬀ than young workers. In order better to understand this, we
should examine the ﬁrm’s optimality condition. Competitive wages for young workers and
11optimal severance payments are determined by equalizing the marginal utility of wealth
when young with the expected marginal utility of next period’s wealth. A decrease in wy
induces an increase in marginal utility when young. On the other hand, an increase in s
has three diﬀerent eﬀects. First, since severance payments increase, the marginal expected
utility of wealth when old decreases due to a decrease in the marginal utility of being ﬁred,
“ceteris paribus”. Secondly, when s increases, ﬁrms ﬁre fewer workers, so the average
ability of retained workers decreases, leading to a reduction in wo. Since the wage given
to old workers decreases, the marginal expected utility when old increases. Finally, since s
increases, the probability that an old worker will be ﬁred decreases, so the expected utility
when old increases. These opposing eﬀects lead to an equilibrium long-term contract where
young workers have lower utility than the old unemployed workers. It is cheaper for the
ﬁrm to give workers higher utility in the old state.
Corollary 2: Since the ﬁrms do not fully insure old workers, the necessary conditions for
unemployment in equilibrium are satisﬁed.
This ensures that in this type of equilibrium, unemployment can exist. Unemployment will




2 ≤ r. Another way to state this condition is that
there will be unemployment if s  > θ
 +θ
h
2 − r, which will be satisﬁed as long as r is large
enough.11 When the value of home production is small, unemployed workers will accept
any newjobs. How ever, w hen r increases, the average ability of the unemployed workers
is much smaller than their home productivity, and thus, they prefer being unemployed.
Although this is true on average, some of those unemployed workers would prefer to work
if they were able to obtain a wage that corresponds to their ability. Since we are interested
in the eﬀects of unemployment insurance, we restrict ourselves to equilibria where this
condition is satisﬁed.
Proposition 4: Since ﬁrms do not fully insure old workers, and given some workers
are more productive at home, there will be too many layoﬀs compared to the eﬃcient
11 This condition is always satisﬁed when r = θ
 +θ
h
2 but never satisﬁed when r =0 . I ti s
possible to ﬁnd an ¯ r for which this condition will be satisﬁed because as we will see later,
s  + r is increasing with r.
12allocation.
It is interesting to see that competition introduces a distortion in equilibrium layoﬀs deci-
sions. This distortion comes from the informational externality. Asymmetric information
creates a rent to the incumbent ﬁrm because the incumbent ﬁrm has better information
about the productivity of their workforce. By bidding away workers, ﬁrms do not care that
they make it harder for other ﬁrms to ensure second period loyalty. In contrast, in section
4.1, there is no such externality because workers can commit themselves to stay at the
same ﬁrm. Propositions 3 and 4 have important implications for government intervention.
First, when ﬁrms do not fully insure their workers, there is too much unemployment in the
economy. This leaves room for government intervention to try to lower the level of unem-
ployment. Moreover, the fact that old workers are not fully insured against unemployment
can increase political incentives for a publicly provided unemployment insurance. Before
considering the implications of government intervention, we look at some comparative
statics.
Proposition 5: Since ﬁrms do not fully insure old workers, severance payments will be
decreasing with r, and given that workers do not exhibit too much decreasing absolute risk
aversion, severance payments will be decreasing in a proportion less than one.
The reason why raising r leads to reductions in severance payments is fairly intuitive and
is a common feature in the literature. A more interesting result is the fact that there is
not perfect crowding out of the severance payments. First, let us see what would happen if
old workers were fully insured in equilibrium. We know from Proposition 3, that the wage
when young has to be lower than wo. Because workers prefer to have smoother utility,
and they are already fully insured when old, any increase in r will be transferred into ﬁrst
period wages. This implies that the reduction will be one-for-one. However, if workers are
not fully insured, only part of the increase in r will be transferred into ﬁrst period wages,
but the other part will be used to better insure old workers. This implies a reduction of
less than one-for-one in severance payments.
If agents exhibit a high degree of decreasing absolute risk aversion, the above result can
13change. We know that in equilibrium workers receive the lowest utility when they are
young. If workers become a lot less risk averse when their income increases, any increase
in r may be used to increase utility when they are young.12 For instance, if workers become
risk neutral after a certain level of income, and this level is smaller than s  + r and w 
o,
but larger than w 
y, any increase in r will be used to increase wy. In this case, workers will
not care about insurance against unemployment since they are risk neutral in this range
of income, but will care about smoothing income between the ﬁrst and the second period.
However, for a reasonable degree of decreasing absolute risk aversion such type of problem
should not occur. Changes in the level of severance payments also have some eﬀects on
wo and on ¯ θ. In equilibrium, the constraint on wo is binding. Old workers’ wages equal
the average ability of a retained worker. Since in equilibrium ¯ θ  = θh −2s ,wek n o w t h a t
w 
o = θ − s . When severance payments increase, ﬁrms ﬁre fewer workers (¯ θ decreases)
because the cost of ﬁring a worker increases. Moreover, an increases in s lowers wo because
the average ability of retained workers decreases.
5.Government Intervention
As mentioned above, we restrict our attention to the equilibrium where, given r is large
enough, unemployment occurs in equilibrium. When there is competition to bid away
old workers, the resulting equilibrium involves too much unemployment compared to the
level of unemployment that maximizes the total surplus of the economy. This motivates
government intervention. On the other hand, in equilibrium old workers are not perfectly
insured against unemployment. Moreover, the unemployment can be interpreted as invol-
untary for at least some workers. All old workers that are ﬁred and have an ability level
θ>rwould be willing to work if they were able to obtain a wage corresponding to their
marginal productivity. However, ﬁrms are not willing to pay that wage because they are
not able to diﬀerentiate these workers from workers with low ability. Consequently, all the
ﬁred workers prefer not taking a new job. This, combined with the fact that ﬁrms do not
provide full insurance against job loss, introduces political incentives for a government to
12 Simulation with utility functions with considerably high level of increasing risk aversion still
leads to a reduction of less that one of one of the severance payments when r increases.
14provide a public unemployment insurance program. We will analyze two questions sep-
arately. First, if a government wishes to provide some public unemployment insurance
(UI), howcan it ﬁnance the UI program w ithout introducing further distortions in the
ﬁrm’s layoﬀ decisions. Then, we will consider how government intervention can reduce or
eliminate the initial distortion inherent in a “laissez-faire” economy.
5.1. Unemployment Insurance System with Experience Rating
We will now introduce a government into this economy. The only role for the government
will be to provide unemployment insurance. The beneﬁt paid to unemployed workers is
denoted b. Further, assume that the government only taxes ﬁrms to ﬁnance this program.13
Let T be the total tax imposed on ﬁrms per period. This tax is composed of two parts.
The ﬁrst part is a payroll tax τ per worker, while the second is an experience rated tax,
where ﬁrms pay a proportion e of the total cost they impose on the UI system due to their
layoﬀ decisions.14 The total tax per period imposed on any ﬁrm will be given by:
T = τ +[ θh + ¯ θ]τ + e[¯ θ − θ ]b. (3)
The ﬁrst term is a payroll tax on young workers, while the second is a payroll tax on old
retained workers. The last term is the experience rating component. The government will
be required to keep a balanced budget. However, since there is no population growth,
we will assume that the government maintains a balanced budget every period. The
government budget constraint is the following: [¯ θ−θ ]b = τ +[θh + ¯ θ]τ +e[¯ θ−θ ]b. Under
a full experience rating system (e = 1), the payroll tax will be equal to zero.
5.2. Competitive Equilibrium with Unemployment Insurance
13 The reasons for only taxing ﬁrms are the following: (1) taxing both ﬁrms and workers will
have the same eﬀect as long as the government use only payroll taxes, and (2) in practice,
this kind of experience rating taxes are always imposed only on ﬁrms.
14 In practice, experience rated taxes are implemented at the industry level to provide insurance
against any idiosyncratic shocks. In the present problem, since ﬁrms are ex ante and ex post
identical, industry and ﬁrm level experience ratings are the same.
15To solve for the competitive equilibrium, we proceed exactly the same way as in section
4. Firms take as given τ and e. First, we solve for the constraint on wo. When a ﬁrm
hires a worker, it has to pay the payroll tax, so ﬁrms will oﬀer a wage equal to the average




in equilibrium, this constraint is satisﬁed with equality, we can solve for ¯ θ. If a ﬁrm keeps
an old worker, the worker will produce θ, but the ﬁrm has nowto pay the w age wo plus
the payroll tax. If the ﬁrm ﬁres the worker, the ﬁrm has to make a severance payment
plus pay an experience rated tax of eb. Solving for the critical ability level at which
the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between ﬁring or retaining the worker, we ﬁnd ¯ θ = θh − 2[s + eb].
We can see that, as before, an increase in severance payments, leads to a decrease in ¯ θ
and subsequently a decrease in layoﬀs. The payroll tax has no direct eﬀect because it
simultaneously increases the cost of keeping a worker and decreases the wage. The level
of experience rating has a direct positive eﬀect on employment by increasing the cost
of ﬁring a worker. In equilibrium, changes in unemployment beneﬁts have two eﬀects.
Taking the partial derivative of ¯ θ with respect to b, we ﬁnd ∂¯ θ
∂b = −2[∂s
∂b + e]. When
the government increases unemployment insurance beneﬁts, as we will see later, severance
payments decrease. This leads to more unemployment in the economy ceteris paribus.
However, the cost of ﬁring a worker increases because of the experience rated tax. Without
any experience rating and as long as severance payments are strictly decreasing with b,U I
will increase unemployment in the economy. However, if e is positive the total eﬀect of UI
can be ambiguous.
We nowsolve for the competitive equilibrium contract {w 
y,w  
o,s  }, which is a function of
{θh,θ  ,r} and {τ,e,b}, and then look at howseverance payments change w hen UI beneﬁts









16θ  + θh
2
− wy − τ +[¯ θ − θ ](−s − eb)+[ θh − ¯ θ]
¯ θ + θh
2
− wo − τ

=0 ,
¯ θ = θh − 2[s + eb]
wo ≥ θh − s − eb − τ
and s ≥ 0.
Here again, ﬁrms maximize the expected utility function of a young worker subject to
a zero-proﬁt condition, a wage restriction, and a non-negativity of severance payments
condition. This problem is similar to the one in section 4. The only diﬀerence nowis that
¯ θ depends on b and e. Also in the zero-proﬁt condition, ﬁrms have to pay a payroll tax
on all workers and a experience rated tax on any laid oﬀ workers. The long term contract
{w 
y,w  
o,s  } is a function of {r, θh,θ  } and the unemployment insurance system {τ,e,b}.15
Lemma 2: Given an unemployment insurance system {τ,e,b}, ﬁrms are not able to fully
smooth workers’ utility across periods as long there exists some workers that are more
productive at home.
As long as UI is not overly generous, the only way ﬁrms can fully smooth utility and satisfy
the zero-proﬁt condition is by not ﬁring any workers. However, following the reasoning
behind proposition 3, ﬁrms still prefer to ﬁre all workers with ability level lower than r.
If UI is too generous, and since that θh ≤ (1 + e)b + τ + r, the severance payments will
be equal to zero because of the non-negativity constraint on s. However, even without
any severance payments, ﬁrms are not able to provide a wage to young workers that is
large enough to smooth utility across both periods. This is because taxes have to be large
enough for the government not to run a deﬁcit in any period.
Proposition 6: As long as ﬁrms still oﬀer severance payments, the equilibrium long term
contract will not fully insure old workers, and the wage of a young workers is less than the
15 The proof of the existence of an equilibrium is similar to the proof of proposition 2, and is
consequently omitted.
17total compensation of workers who are laid oﬀ, (w 
y <r+ b + s  <w  
o).
When ﬁrms oﬀer severance payments in equilibrium, they retain the right to reduce sev-
erance payments and give a higher wage to young workers. For the same reason as before,
ﬁrms will try to smooth the utility of workers by not oﬀering perfect insurance. However,
if the UI system becomes too generous and the non-negativity constraint on severance
payments is binding, then this allows workers to be fully insured. Because ﬁrms simulta-
neously try to smooth wealth across periods and insure old workers against unemployment,
it is possible that UI can completely crowd out severance payments before old workers have
been fully insured. At a minimum, severance payments will become completely crowded
out when old workers become fully insured. We know that in equilibrium, w 
o = θh−s−eb−t
and that unemployed workers receive r+s  +b.T h i si m p l i e st h a ti fb = θ
h−r−t
1+e , ﬁrms will
deﬁnitively not oﬀer any severance payments.16
Proposition 7: Given that s  > 0, severance payments are decreasing in b.M o r e o v e r ,
assuming that workers do not exhibit a high degree of decreasing risk aversion; if e<1,
severance payments are decreasing in a proportion less than one; if e>1, severance
payments are decreasing in a proportion more than one, and if e = 1, severance payments
are decreasing in a one-to-one proportion. However, if s  = 0 severance payments are
independent of b.
The result that severance payments are a decreasing function of UI beneﬁts is not surprising
and is consistent with the previous literature. However, the fact that the crowding out eﬀect
is a function of the level of experience rating has important implications. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. When b increases, old workers are better insured against
unemployment. Given positive severance payments, ﬁrms can nowreduce them. How ever,
since old workers are not perfectly insured, ﬁrms will consequently try to insure them
better by diminishing the severance payments by less than the amount b increases. On the
other hand, ﬁrms have to pay more tax when UI beneﬁts increase because of experience
16 If government sets b>θ
h−r−t
1+e , unemployed agents are better oﬀ than old workers. If it is




18rating. When e<1, the change in the experience rated tax is less than the change in b.
Consequently, if the ﬁrms reduce s b yt h es a m ea m o u n tt h a tb increases, their proﬁts will
increase. Thus, by competition ﬁrms will be able to use part of this increase to smooth
workers’ utility, but also use part to increase the wealth of old unemployed workers. When
e = 1, severance payments and UI beneﬁts become perfect substitutes, resulting in perfect
crowding out. Finally when e>1, increases in experience rated tax will be larger than
the increase in UI beneﬁt. Firms will reduce the severance payments by more than the
increase in b to ﬁnance the tax. Here again if workers exert too much absolute increasing
risk aversion, they will not care that much of being insure against layoﬀ but will prefer
smooth the income between young and old, and this because (w 
y <r+ b + s  <w  
o).
5.3. Impact of Unemployment Insurance System
Having fully characterized the competitive equilibrium in the presence of UI, we now
consider the impact of government intervention. To begin, we restrict our attention to the
case where severance payments are positive in equilibrium. The ﬁrst question is how a
government can introduce UI without changing the level of employment in the economy.
We knowthat w ithout UI, old w orkers are under-insured, and this might create a political
incentive for the government to give unemployment beneﬁt to these workers. We will
now ﬁnd the level of experience rating that allows the government to provide UI without
changing the level of unemployment. We knowthat ¯ θ = θh − 2[s + eb], and the larger ¯ θ
is, the more unemployment there will be. The change in unemployment with respect to b,
is given by ∂¯ θ
∂b = −2[∂s
 
∂b + e]. Given Proposition 7, we can see that if e =1 ,t h el e v e lo f
employment does not change when UI beneﬁts change. Moreover since the crowding out
of s is complete when e = 1, old workers are equivalently insured.
Proposition 8: Given that s  > 0, the government cannot reduce ineﬃciency in the
layoﬀ decisions created by UI, and at the same time, increase the insurance provided to
old workers.
When e = 1, the reduction in severance payments is equal to the increase in UI beneﬁts.
We also knowthat if e<1, the reduction in severance payments is smaller than the
19increase in UI beneﬁts (0 > ∂s
 
∂b > −1). More important, ∂s
 
∂b + e<0 One implication is,
since we know that ∂¯ θ
∂b = −2[∂s
 
∂b + e], then unemployment in the economy will increase.
There are already too many laid oﬀ workers in the “laissez-faire” equilibrium and UI
makes it worst. However, a second implication is that old workers end up better insured
against unemployment. When e>1, UI can reduce the ineﬃciency resulting from layoﬀs
by reducing the number of layoﬀs. On the other hand, workers are less insured against
unemployment. Consequently, the government faces the following trade oﬀ, increasing the
level of experience rating increases the total surplus in the economy, but subsequently
reduces old workers’ insurance.
6.Conclusion
We characterized an economy where ﬁrms hire workers without knowing their ability. Once
ﬁrms learn the productivity of their workers, they can choose to lay some oﬀ. Retained
workers, receive good wage oﬀers from rival ﬁrms, and ﬁred workers are not able to ﬁnd a
job with a wage higher than their reservation wage. This type of competition leads to too
much unemployment and under-insurance of old workers.
We looked at the impact of unemployment insurance on this type of competition and found
that as long as ﬁrms provide severance payments, the government cannot reduce unem-
ployment while simultaneously increasing insurance against being laid oﬀ. The reasoning
is that a lowlevel of experience rating increases layoﬀs because ﬁrms do not face the full
cost of laying oﬀ a worker. However, because severance payments are reduced by less than
the increase in unemployment beneﬁts when the level of experience rating is low, workers
are better insured when the government provides unemployment insurance. On the other
hand, high levels of experience rating make it more costly for ﬁrms to ﬁre workers and thus
reduce layoﬀs. This result has a positive eﬀect on the economy, since there were too many
layoﬀs compared to the eﬃcient allocation of the “laissez-faire” economy. However, high
levels of experience rating subsequently reduce the insurance that old workers receive.
In this version of the paper, we restrict our attention to cases where ﬁrms still provide
severance payments when unemployment insurance is publicly provided. A possible ex-
20tension will be to analyze the situation when severance payments are completely crowded
out. When this occurs, the government now may be able to increase workers’ wealth while
unemployed and simultaneously reduce unemployment in the economy.
217.Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1: The ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem can be rewritten
the following way:

U(r + s) − U(wo)

+( θ
h − wo + s)

U





U(wo) − U(r + s)

+( wo − s − θ )

U (r + s) − U (wy)

=0 , (A2)
θ  + θh
2
− wy − [wo − s − θ ]s +[ θh − wo + s]






Equations (A1) and (A2) represents the trade-oﬀ between wy, wo and s, while equation
(A3) is simply the zero-proﬁt condition. We can see that if wy = wo = r + s all the ﬁrst
order conditions are satisﬁed.
Proof of Corollary 1: When ﬁrms fully insure workers, wo = s + r.W ea l s ok n o wt h a t
¯ θ = wo − s,s o¯ θ = r.




U(θh − s ) − U(r + s )















y)+ψ =0 . (B1)
θ  + θh
2
− w 
y − [θh − θ  − 2s ]s  =0 , (B2)
ψ : s ≥ 0 sψ =0 ψ ≥ 0, (B3)
22w 
o = θh − s , (B4)
where ψ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint s ≥ 0. Equation (B1) represents the
trade-oﬀ between wy and s, while equation (B2) is simply the zero-proﬁt condition. The
Kuhn-Tucker condition (B3) implies that if s>0t h e nψ = 0. The old worker’s wages
are given by (B4). First, we know that new workers are bid away by the market at some
wage which does not depend on the worker’s ability. The wage for young workers will be
determine by the zero proﬁt condition (B2) for any given wo and s. Second, if a worker
is kept in the second period, the ﬁrm need to oﬀer a wage suﬃciently large to ensure that
the worker will stay. Consequently, using (B4) and (B1) we can solve for w 
o and s .
Proof of Lemma 1: When ﬁrms fully smooth workers’ utility wy = wo = θ
h+r
2 , s = θ
h−r
2
and ψ =0 .
The ﬁrst order conditions on the zero-proﬁt constraint is given by:

θ  − r
2

[1 + θh − r]=0 ( C)
Note that equation (C) cannot be satisﬁed as long as θ  <r .
Proof of Proposition 3: First we will show thatw 
o >r+s . Suppose that w 
o = r+s ,
then ﬁrst order condition (B1) becomes [θh − θ  − 4s ][U (r + s ) − U (w 
y)] = 0. This
implies that r+s  = w 
o = w 
y, but we know from Lemma 1 that this is not possible. Now,
we will show that w 
y <r+ s  in equilibrium. If we reorganize equation (B1) we get:
2[U(w 
o)− U(r +s )]+ [θh − θ  − 2s ][U (r +s )− U (w 
y)]+ 2s [U (w 
y) −U (w 
o)]. (D)
Since w 
o >r+ s , we can see that the ﬁrst term is positive. Since s>0, we can show,
using the zero-proﬁt condition, that w 
o >w  
y. The third term is also positive by concavity.






This implies that the second term must be negative, and by concavity we know that it
implies that s  + r>w y.





Substituting for ¯ θ, this condition becomes s  ≥ θ
 +θ
h
2 − r.S i n c e θh − θ  − 2s  > 0, we
knowthat s [1 + (θh − θ  − 2s )] >s . Now we will look at the condition under which
s [1 + (θh − θ  − 2s )] ≥ θ
 +θ
h
2 − r. We can reorganize these inequalities in the following
way: s  +r>θ
 +θ
h




2 − [θh − θ  − 2s]s, which implies that in order for w 
o ≤ r to be possible s  + r
must be larger than w 
y.
Proof of Proposition 4: We knowfrom proposition 2 and 3 that θ
h−r
2 >s>0. This
implies that θh > ¯ θ>r .
Proof of Proposition 5: Conducting comparative statics on the ﬁrst order conditions




α =[ θh − θ  − 2s ]U  (r + s ) − 2U (r + s ),
β =4[U (w 
o)+U (r + s ) − U (w 
y)] − [θh − θ  − 2s ]U  (r + s )
− 2s U  (w 
o) − [θh − θ  − 4s ]2U  (w 
y).
F i r s t ,wec a ns e et h a t α is clearly negative. Moreover, assuming that the second order
condition are satisfy (−β) has to be negative so β>0. This imply that ∂s
 
∂r is negative.
We can also see that −∂s
 
∂r < 1i fβ + α>0.




U (r + s ) − U (w 
y)]
− 2s U  (w 
o) − [θh − θ  − 4s ]2U  (w 
y). (E1)
24If we look at β +α (E1 )wec a ns e et h a ta l lt h et e r m sa r ed e ﬁ n i t i v e l yp o s i t i v e ,e x c e p t
the ﬁrst one which can be positive or negative. First add and subtract the term 2s U  (w 
y)
in expression (E1), and we get:
β − (−α)= [ 4 U (w 
o) − 2s U  (w 
o)] − [4U (w 




U (r + s ) − 2s U  (w 
y) − [θh − θ  − 4s ]2U  (w 
y). (E2)
We can see that all the terms are deﬁnitively positive to the exception of [4U (w 
o) −
2s U  (w 
o)] − [4U (w 
y) − 2s U  (w 
y)] This term will be positive if:























Because u   (w) < 0wek n o w t h a t U  (w 




U(w) the absolute risk aversion




but not excessively decreasing, β + α will remain positive. Note that the same argument
hold for U   (w), by continuity β + α will remain positive even if U   (w) < 0a sl o n gi ti s
small in absolute term. This implies that if agent do not exhibiting high level of decreasing
absolute risk aversion, then β + α>0. Since α<0 it implies that −α







P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :In the proof of Lemma 2 we can proceed directly the same way as
with Lemma 1. The only diﬀerence is that here the non-negativity constraint on s can
become binding. Full smoothing implies that r + b + s  = w 
o = θh − s  − eb − τ.T h e
non-negativity constraint on s will become binding only if θh ≤ (1 + e)b + τ + r.F i r s t ,
consider the case where s  > 0. If we reorganize the zero-proﬁt condition to where young
and old workers get the same utility (s  =
θ
h−(1+e)b−τ−r
2 and w 





weg e t :
−

r − θ 
2
−
(1 − e)b + τ
2

[1 + θh − r − (1 − e)b − t] ≥ 0. (F1)
We also knowthat government has to balance it’s budget. Using the government budget
constraint, the zero-proﬁt condition (F1) become:
25−

r − θ 
2
−





However, when r>θ   condition (F2) cannot be satisﬁed given that the government needs
to balance it’s budget. The only way that this condition can be satisﬁed is if e>1a n d
t>0, but this implies a surplus. However, if e<1a n dt<0, then there will be a deﬁcit.
Similarly, we can show that when s  = 0, full smoothing is not possible without violating
the zero-proﬁt condition or the government’s balanced-budget condition.
Proof of Proposition 6: As long as s  > 0, Proposition 6 can be proved the same way
as Proposition 3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :If we take the ﬁrst order conditions, reorganize them and





η = − 4e[U (w 
o) − U (w 
y)] − 2(1 + e)U (r + s  + b)+[ θh − θ  − 2(s  + eb)]U  (r + s  + b)
+2 e(s





  − 4(s





β  =4[U (w 
o)+U (r + s  + b) − U (w 
y)] − [θh − θ  − 2(s  + eb)]U  (r + s  + b)
− 2(s  + eb)U  (w 
o) − [θh − θ  − 4(s  + eb)]2U  (w 
y).
If the second order conditions are satisfy η is negative and β  is positive. This implies that
∂s
 
∂b < 0. We can also see that if η +β>1t h e n−∂s
 
∂b < 1, if η +β =1t h e n−∂s
 
∂b =1a n d
if η + β<1t h e n−∂s
 
∂b > 1.
η + β  =4(1 − e)[U (w 
o) − U (w 
y)] + [4 − 2(1 + e)]U (r + s )
− 2(1 − e)s U  (w 
o) − (1 − e)[θh − θ  − 4s ]2U  (w 
y). (G1)
26If we look at (G1) we can see that if e =1t h e nη + β  =1s o−∂s
 
∂b =1 . M o r e o v e r ,
if e<1 all terms are multiplied by 1 − e>0( U (r + s ) is multiplies by [4 − 2(1 + e)]
which is also positive. The problem is essentially the same that in Proposition 5 so agent
do not exhibiting high level of decreasing absolute risk aversion η + β  > 1s o−∂s
 
∂b < 1.
An increase in e will lead to a reduction in 1−e and in 4−2(1+e)s oη +β  will decrease
and −∂s
 
∂b will increase. On the other hand, if e>1 then if agent do not exhibiting high
level of decreasing absolute risk aversion η + β  < 1s o−∂s
 
∂b > 1.












β. It is possible to showthat ∂s
 
∂b +e<1wh e n e<1, ∂s
 
∂b +e =1wh e n
e =1 ,a n d ∂s
 
∂b + e>1wh e n e>1.
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